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A CAPACITATED COMMODITY TRADING 










We consider in this paper the problem of a trader that may purchase a commodity in one 
market and resell it in another. The trader is capacitated: the trading volume is limited by 
operational constraints, e.g., logistics. The two markets quote different prices, but the 
spread is reduced when trading takes place. We are interested in finding the optimal trading 
policy across the markets so as to obtain the maximum profit in the long-term, taking into 
account that the trading activity influences the price processes, i.e., market power. Similarly 
to the no-market-power case, we find that the optimal policy is determined by three regions 
where (1) move as much as possible from one market to the other; (2) the same in the 
opposite direction; or (3) do nothing. We finally use the model to analyze the kerosene 




1 Professor, Production, Technology and Operations Management, IESE 





2 -  IESE Business School-University of Navarra 
 
 
A CAPACITATED COMMODITY TRADING 







Commodities are the building block of a large part of our economy. Examples include 
not only minerals, metals and agricultural products such as iron ore, aluminum, 
silver, gold, sugar, coﬀee, rice, wheat, but also energy sources such as coal, oil, and 
natural or liquiﬁed gas, and even intermediary or manufactured products such as 
chemicals or generic drugs. They are nowadays relatively easily traded, can be 
physically delivered anywhere in the world, and sometimes can be stored for a 
reasonable period of time. The volume of commodity trading in the world is colossal: 
in 2006, more than 91 million 60-kg coﬀee bags were traded, more than 84 million 
barrels of oil are daily consumed, etc. Commodities are traded in very active markets, 
such as the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), the New York Mercantile Exchange 
(NYMEX), or the London Metal Exchange (LME), to cite a few. Prices are usually 
determined by market forces, rather than by the large suppliers or large buyers, with 
the exception perhaps of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC). Spot prices at commodity markets exhibit several salient features: they are 
highly autocorrelated, and very volatile with rare but violent explosions in price. The 
volatility has been explained by inventory holding dynamics: where speculators carry 
inventory, the price remains stable, but when they are out-of-stock, the price 
ﬂuctuates wildly, see Deaton and Laroque (1992). 
 It is commonly assumed that the price of a commodity is the same in any point in the
world, as occurs for stocks or bonds. This is not so, as the price in each location is adjusted for
logistics costs and local market conditions (local balance of supply and demand) among others.
For example, a co®ee producer with a several factories in Europe will pay the di®erent prices
for deliveries in each one of the factories. One would assume that these di®erences are very
small, or at least stable over time. As a matter of fact, the opposite is true, and price spreads,
i.e., price di®erence between two locations, can be signi¯cant in the short term. As an example,
which we analyze in detail in x6.1, we show in Figure 1 the evolution of kerosene jet-fuel spot
prices, in New York and Los Angeles, over more than ¯fteen years. As can be seen in the left
¯gure, the evolution of the price in these two locations is very similar. This implies that in
the long-run the price spread is small. However, when examining, in the right ¯gure, the price


























































































































































































In such market, there is a good opportunity for commodity traders to enter the market,
and, in the short-run, make a pro¯t. In stock and bond markets, these constitute arbitrage
opportunities that disappear as soon as they appear. For commodities, however, it takes time
for traders to close the price spreads to its average levels. In order to understand the market,
it is important to elucidate how a trader should behave, according to its own trading capacity.
Trading capacity may consist of shipping from one market to the other, which may be costly, for
example. We must of course consider that the trading activity has an impact on the price levels
in each market, i.e., the price at a location increases if a trader buys from it, and decreases if
he sells to it: each trader has market power.
2In the current paper, we propose an analytical model of commodity trading in the presence
of market power, which is new to the literature. We establish the rational behavior of traders
between two markets and derive price spread dynamics based on the trading volumes. We
consider two markets of commodities that quote di®erent prices, and a trader is capable of
purchasing in one market to resell in the other, within a trading capacity. For simplicity, we
consider only two markets and assume that the inventory present between the two markets
is constant, i.e., the amount stored is ¯xed (and is directly linked to the trading capacity).
We ¯rst establish the structure of the optimal trading policy. This policy determines, given
a realization of the current price spread between the two markets, how much (if any) volume
must be bought/sold from/at the ¯rst market and sold/bought at/from the second market, so
that the long-run average pro¯t is maximized. When optimizing, the trader takes into account
its impact on future spreads. We then describe the parameters of the optimal policy and we
apply our model to kerosene prices in New York and Los Angeles, and illustrate the insights
derived.
This model can be used for many di®erent purposes. At an operational level, it allows the
trader to specify when and how much to trade. At a more tactical and strategic level, the
trader can predict the price spread distribution by looking at the trading capacity used for
each spread level, and evaluate the impact of trading capacity additions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In x2, we review the previous literature and how
our paper is related to it. x3 describes in detail the model with its assumptions and notation.
Then, in x4 we present the results for di®erent market situations (monopoly, oligopoly), together
with the optimality equations that characterize the optimal policy, and a numerical sensitivity
analysis. x5 discusses several extensions of the basic model set-up. Finally, in x6 we show an
application of our model to kerosene prices and discuss future research directions.
2 Literature Review
There is signi¯cant research on commodity prices and commodity trading, with at least two
di®erent literature streams: the ¯rst one, from economics and ¯nance, and the second one, from
operations management.
The ¯rst research stream studies the properties of commodity price evolution in established
markets. One of the ¯rst important papers in this area is Deaton and Laroque (1992), which
show that commodity prices have high autocorrelation and variability. They develop a rational
expectations model for commodity prices that explains these features. They base their model
on supply/demand forces and in particular on the existence of competitive speculators that hold
3inventory of the commodity, with which they expect to buy low and sell high. This behavior
results in commodity prices normally staying within some limited range; here, speculators
will build inventory when the price is low, and deplete it when it is high. As a result, the
speculators act as regulators of the commodity prices. Sometimes, however, when supply and
demand shocks push the price high, the speculators may run out of inventory, and hence spikes
in prices will occur. Deaton and Laroque (1996) extend this work and ¯nd that speculation
only is not enough to explain the high positive autocorrelation in observed commodity prices
and that part of it is caused by the underlying processes of supply and demand.
Williams and Wright (1991), Chambers and Bailey (1996) and Routledge et al. (2000)
also use a competitive rational expectations model to explain the properties of commodity
prices in markets. They all consider the existence of convenience yield, which is de¯ned in
Hull (2003) as a measure of the bene¯ts from owning a commodity asset versus holding a long
futures contract on the asset. This is generally positive since carrying inventory allows the
owner to make pro¯ts from trading opportunities that may arise, for instance from temporary
local shortages; on the other hand, holding a futures contract does not allow it. For example,
an oil re¯ner is unlikely to regard a futures contract on crude oil as equivalent to crude oil
held in inventory: the crude oil in inventory can be an input to the re¯ning process whereas
a futures contract cannot be used for this purpose. The convenience yield typically re°ects
the market's expectations concerning the future availability of the commodity. As noted in
Hull (2003), the greater the chances that shortages will occur, the higher the convenience
yield. One can describe spot prices evolution by modeling convenience yields and spot prices as
separate stochastic processes, possibly correlated, see Gibson and Schwartz (1990). Schwartz
(1997) develops three variations of a mean-reverting stochastic model driven by one, two or
three factors taking into account mean reversion of commodity prices, convenience yields and
stochastic interest rates. Schwartz and Smith (2000) provide a two-factor stochastic spot price
model determined by the combination of short-term and long-term factors, that allow volatility
in both terms. This two-factor model is equivalent to the stochastic convenience yield model
developed in Gibson and Schwartz (1990). These models are empirically validated for copper,
gold and crude oil. Our paper does not directly model mean-reverting spot price processes or
convenience yields, as in these papers, but focuses instead on modeling price spreads.
Routledge et al. (1998) consider the correlation between prices of di®erent commodities
within broad families (e.g., natural gas and electricity in energy). They model the substitutabil-
ity of these commodities and ¯nd existence of equilibrium price processes, where rational agents
convert one commodity into the other. In particular, they focus on natural gas and electricity,
and analyze the spread (price di®erence) between these two commodities. This is known in the
4industry as the spark spread, and is used extensively by commodity traders. The industry also
uses the dark spread, i.e., the spread between coal and electricity prices. In our paper, we focus
on price spreads between di®erent geographical locations, although the work could be extended
to spreads between di®erent commodities, as discussed in x6.2. We take a similar approach,
and speci¯cally consider the individual operational actions of rational traders, which allows us
to describe in closed-form the agents' actions.
A second stream of literature on commodities exists in operations management. The papers
in this group typically focus on the management of inventory of commodities, in the presence
of price uncertainty, with buy/sell decisions in a single market. There is extensive literature on
inventory management models, see for example Zipkin (2000). We refer readers to Goel and
Gutierrez (2004, 2006, 2007), and references therein for speci¯c applications into commodities.
These papers try to incorporate the information given by the convenience yield in the inventory
and buy/sell decisions, e.g., Caldentey et al. (2007) for copper mining operations in Chile, where
they use the stochastic process in Schwartz (1997) to model copper spot prices. In this sense,
they try to combine ¯nance and operations models.
In this group, Golabi (1985) models the prices of the commodity in future periods as random
variables with known distribution functions. Assuming constant demand, he proves that a
sequence of critical price levels at a given period determines the optimal ordering strategy. Wang
(2001) proves that a myopic inventory policy is optimal for a multi-period model with stochastic
demand and decreasing prices. Secomandi (2005) considers optimal commodity trading and
provides a much more detailed view of the operations involved in trading. He focuses on
storage assets, i.e. storage facilities or contracts that ensure that one will have the inventory at
a pre-determined time. His model is based on inventory and well-behaved °ow constraints. He
shows that the optimal policy is, depending on the region, to buy and withdraw, to do nothing
or to sell and inject. This type of policy is used for contract valuation in Secomandi (2004) and
Wang et al. (2007).
Our work combines the ideas of price equilibrium, from economics and ¯nance, together
with a more detailed view of operations, as in Secomandi (2005). We are speci¯cally interested
in optimizing the inventory management policy, given that the trading activity may in°uence
the price spread process.
53 The Model
3.1 Two Markets
Consider the trading of a single commodity in two locations, A and B. Each one of these
locations has its own local dynamics, and as a result the price at which the commodity trades
in each place may be di®erent. As mentioned in the introduction, for kerosene prices, these
local price di®erences can be signi¯cant, see the descriptive statistics presented in x6.1.
Trading may also occur between A and B. In particular, traders may choose to buy in
one place and ship the commodity, at a cost, to the other. In reality, shipping of physical
commodities cannot be done immediately, and is only feasible after a certain lead-time. For the
sake of simplicity (and tractability), however, we assume that this lead-time is zero. Implicitly,
we are assuming that at any given time, what is bought in one location is sold at the other.
Thus, our basic model describes a pipeline, where no intermediate storage is allowed. In other
words, a trader simply opens a faucet so that the commodity °ows from A to B or vice-versa.
We consider in addition that the pipeline capacity is given by the maximum achievable °ow,
in units per period. Note that the model could also handle a shipping process that does not
involve a pipeline, as long as the inventory level in each part of the route remains constant.
For instance, consider a set of trucks or ships that on each day can move towards A or towards
B (all together). The quantity originating in A and arriving in B will be identical, and will
be constrained by the maximum speed in the system. We denote by qAB the trading capacity
from A to B, per period, and qBA the one from B to A.
In addition, we consider constant linear trading costs. We denote cAB the cost of moving
one unit from A to B, and cBA from B to A. Using constant linear costs is a strong assumption,
since it is independent of the price of the commodity1, but it has been made before in the
literature, e.g., Goel and Gutierrez (2006).
Let uAB
t and uBA
t be the trading quantity from A to B and from B to A respectively, at
time t. The capacity constraint implies that
0 · uAB
t · qAB and 0 · uBA
t · qBA
and the trading cost incurred is equal to cABuAB
t + cBAuBA
t .
The trading policy, if decided rationally, should obviously depend on the prices quoted in A
and B. For example, when PB
t ¡PA
t > cAB, it is pro¯table to trade from A to B. Clearly, if the
1For instance, if the trading cost is a fraction of the dollar volume of trade, the cost would be a constant times the spot
price at the buying market times the trading quantity. While this is numerically solvable, the analysis becomes intractable,
see x5.2.
6current trading activity does not in°uence the future prices, the trader would try to maximize
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It is easy to see that the optimal policy is such that either uAB
t = 0 or uBA














In other words, we will trade at maximum capacity provided that the price spread is bigger
than the trading cost. As noted before, if PA
t and PB
t are independent of the trading quantities,
this trading policy is optimal, as shown in Secomandi (2005).
Of course, if many traders follow this type of policy, the price at the cheaper market would
rise and the price at the other market would go down, so the spread would tend to close over
time. Hence, it is clear that the trading volume must impact the prices in the future. If this
was not the case, we would see large spreads between locations, and more importantly, that
these spreads may not close over time.
As a result, if the trading quantities do in°uence future prices, it is no longer clear what
type of policy is now optimal for the trader. This requires modeling the relationship between
global trading policies and the price spread process. This is done in the next section.
3.2 The Price Processes
We model time as a continuous variable, t ¸ 0, and we denote the price of the commodity in
markets A and B as PA
t and PB
t respectively. In the previous section, we have de¯ned the net
trading quantity at time t as ut := uAB
t ¡ uBA
t . Using the same notation, vt := vAB
t ¡ vBA
t
denotes what the other players in the market (competitors) trade from A to B. Of course, this
is positive when the quantity °ows from A to B and negative otherwise.
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t are independent Wiener processes, ® can be any exogenous function, and
¯A;¯B;¾¢¢¢ ¸ 0.
As we can observe, the trade between A and B has a direct impact on the prices process,
which captures the players' market power. Speci¯cally, the total net trade from A to B at t,
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Figure 2: Summary of model features. The trader can ship uAB units of commodity from A to B and uBA
units from B to A.
i.e., ut + vt, if positive, increases the price at A and decreases it at B. This is qualitatively
intuitive. Furthermore, we model this dependency as linear2.
Notice also that the proposed model could exhibit mean-reversion properties, as long as the









, where ¹ would be the long-term mean price, de¯ned as a weighted
average of prices at A and B.
Finally, in contrast with models in ¯nance, e.g., Schwartz (1997), we consider linear random
walks, instead of geometric ones. Our assumption guarantees tractability of the trading prob-
lem. However, since geometric Brownian motions might be more appropriate, we explore an
alternative model in x5.2.
2This is a strong assumption, which is related to having linear price-quantity demand curves.
8Since the pro¯t captured by the trader depends on the price spread, we de¯ne Gt := PB
t ¡PA
t .
From Equation (1), we have that dGt = ¡(¯A + ¯B)(ut + vt)dt + (¾B2 ¡ ¾A2)dW2
t ¡ (¾A1 ¡
¾B1)dW1
t : Thus, Gt is a stochastic process that can be expressed as
dGt = ¡¯(ut + vt)dt + ¾dWt; (2)
where ¯ = ¯A + ¯B, ¾2 = (¾B2 ¡ ¾A2)2 + (¾A1 ¡ ¾B1)2 and Wt a Wiener process.
In the remainder of the paper, we assume that the traded quantity vt (related to the rest of
the market) only depends on Gt. This assumption guarantees tractability. As a result, since
both revenue and cost depend only on Gt, it follows that, at optimality, the trader's policy ut
should only be a function of the spread Gt.3
Hence, considering that ut and vt are functions of Gt only, i.e., ut = u(Gt) and vt = v(Gt),
the random variable G, satis¯es the stochastic di®erential equation dGt = A(G)dWt +B(G)dt,
with A(G) = ¾ and B(G) = ¡¯(u(G) + v(G)). If for a certain ² > 0, lim
G!¡1
B ¸ ² and
lim
G!+1










This is known as the Kolmogorov equation, and is a backward parabolic partial di®erential
3Thus, in a game setting, this would be a Nash equilibrium, since the best-response to a trading policy that depends only












Thus, the control u(G) has a direct in°uence on the p.d.f. of the spread. We denote it by
fu(G) to make that dependency apparent. As an illustration, we show in Figure 3 the stationary
p.d.f. for two controls u, where v ´ 0.






































































































fG, with v ´ 0, ¯ = 1 and ¾ = 1, where, in the ¯gure on the left, u = ¡2 for
G < 0 and u = +2 for G ¸ 0; and, in the ¯gure on the right, u = ¡2 for G < ¡10, u = 0 for ¡10 · G < 10
and u = +2 for G ¸ 10.
4As we see later on, we are interested in the long term average pro¯ts, and hence we do not consider the transients solutions
of the Kolmogorov equation, that involve
@f
@t
. To quickly justify the equation, we can consider the backward problem. The
probability that the spread is G at time t + dt, denoted as f(G;t + dt), depends only on where the spread was at time t, as
we deal with a Markovian process. So we have
f(G;t + dt) = EÁ
·




where Á(²) is a Gaussian distribution (EÁ[²] = 0;EÁ[²
2] = 1, and
R 1
¡1 Á(²)d² = 1). When the p.d.f. is stationary, a second
order Taylor approximation yields
f(G) = f(G;t + dt) =
Z 1
¡1


























































This yields Equation (3). For more references, see Wilmott (1997) for details on the methodology.
10For simplicity5, we restrict our attention to having both u and v piecewise constant functions.








This explicitly links the traded quantity u to the price spread distribution fu.
3.3 Optimization of Trading Policies
Given a realization of the price spread at time t, Gt, and given capacities qAB;qBA, we are
interested in ¯nding the optimal operating policy u that maximizes the trader's long-run average
pro¯ts. The optimal policy provides, given a price spread between the two markets, where and
how much product to buy and sell. There are two components in the pro¯t: the revenue, Gtut,
and the trading cost, cABu+
t + cBAu¡









where the expectation is taken with respect to fu, the stationary distribution of Gt. Hence,







Gu(G) ¡ cABu+(G) ¡ cBAu¡(G)
´
fu(G)dG







¡qBA · u(G) · qAB
fu a p.d.f.
(7)
where fu(G) is the spread distribution that depends on our control. This formulation has
the advantage of being quite compact. Alternatively, we could have considered a discounted











one can observe that here we would need to consider the transient distribution of Gt, given
that at time t = 0, G0 is the spread. A discrete version of the problem would raise similar
5The model can incorporate non-piecewise linear controls, but the analysis becomes signi¯cantly more complex.














The problem posed by maximizing J(u;G0) in Equation (8) can be solved using optimal control.
Interestingly, as we show in x5.1, the structure of the results that we derive for our basic problem
setting, i.e., focusing on average pro¯ts, Equation (7), hold for this alternative formulation.
4 Optimal Trading Policies
After relating the trading quantity to the price spread distribution, we are interested in ¯nding
the optimal policy u that maximizes the trader's problem (7). We ¯rst analyze the case of
\monopoly", where there are no other traders between A and B (i.e., v ´ 0) and then solve the
general case.
4.1 Monopoly: v ´ 0
We consider here an extreme case of our problem: the trader has no competitors trading
between A and B. We call this a monopoly. Note that this does not mean that the trader is a
price-setter in A or B, but rather that he is the only player in the link between A and B. In





. Intuitively, one would think that
this is the situation in which the trader can make highest pro¯ts. The next propositions show
that, in fact, it is optimal to trade as little as possible, unless the price spread is really large,
in order to maximize the average trading pro¯t.
Proposition 1 If
(i) cAB = cBA = 0 and
(ii) v(G) = 0 8G,




This result is somehow surprising. Indeed, in the short term, it would be better to instantly
gain, at time t, GtqAB if Gt > 0 or ¡GtqBA if Gt < 0. However, by doing this every time, the
trader would quickly modify the spread p.d.f. and push Gt close to zero, which would reduce
future pro¯ts. Alternatively, the trader could delay the trade until jGtj is large, in which case, he
would obtain higher pro¯ts, but in fewer occasions. The proposition shows that both strategies
will actually yield the same average pro¯t in the long term when the trading cost is zero. In
12other words, the overall average bene¯t does not depend on the concrete feasible policy: it is
the same to trade often, even with small spreads, or to delay the trade until spreads are large.
In contrast, the optimal policy does matter when there are trading costs.
Proposition 2 If
(i) cAB;cBA > 0 and
(ii) v(G) = 0 8G,





¡qBA if G · M
0 if ¡ M < G · M
qAB if G > M




Proposition 2 incorporates cost. Proposition 1 implied that when v ´ 0, and cAB = cBA = 0,
then the average long-run pro¯t is independent of the trading quantity. When the costs are
positive, the policy of not trading anything therefore yields the same average pro¯t, and is
optimal. Since such a policy is actually not feasible (the p.d.f. is not well-de¯ned), we show
that the same objective can be achieved as the limit of feasible policies.
4.2 Oligopoly: v(G) 6= 0
We have so far assumed that the trader was the only player with the ability to trade and
make pro¯ts from the price spread. We consider below a market with several competitors.
Competition might change the structure of the optimal policy because the distribution now
also depends on how the competitors in°uence the market. We have denoted this in°uence as
v(G), where v(G) is the total net quantity traded from A to B, by all the competitors. In that









































¡ v(G) · qAB
f a p.d.f.
(10)
This reformulation has the advantage that the trading volume u is no longer present. We
can thus optimize directly taking f as the decision variable. The optimization problem can be
fully solved, with the support of a technical lemma (see appendix). In short, we ¯nd necessary
conditions that characterize the optimal function f. Since the p.d.f. and the trading quantity
u(G) are directly related, this is equivalent to ¯nding the optimal trading policy.
Proposition 3 If
(i) cAB = cBA = 0 and
(ii) v(G) is non-decreasing, limG!+1 v(G) > 0 and limG!¡1 v(G) < 0,
then there exists m such that the optimal policy for our trading problem (7) is
u(G) =
(
¡qBA if G · m
qAB if G > m:
The proposition requires a regularity assumption on v, in order to have a well-de¯ned optimal
policy, and avoid asymptotically optimal solutions, as in Proposition 2. Under such condition,
when there are no costs, we ¯nd that the optimal trading policy is to trade as much as possible
from one market to the other, with the trading direction depending on whether the spread G is
higher or lower that a threshold m. We show the result by establishing that, in problem (10),




We next generalize the preceding results to the general case, with cAB;cBA > 0. In that






























¡ v(G) · qAB
f a p.d.f.
(11)
Solving the problem above yields the following theorem.
14Theorem 1 If
(i) cAB;cBA > 0 and
(ii) v(G) is non-decreasing, limG!+1 v(G) > 0 and limG!¡1 v(G) < 0,






¡qBA if G · mBA
0 if mBA < G · mAB
qAB if G > mAB:
In essence, the optimal trading policy is determined by three regions: [¡1;mBA] where it is
optimal to move as much product as possible from market B to the market A; (mAB;1], where
the same is true from A to B, the opposite direction; and (mBA;mAB] where it is optimal to do
nothing. This is the same structure as in the case with no market power. In our notation, with
no market power, mBA = ¡cBA and mAB = cAB. Hence, market power changes the optimal
trading policy by delaying the point where the traders begin to ship product from one market
to the other.
The theorem thus generalizes Propositions 1, 2 and 3. The proof of the theorem is interesting,
as it uses necessary conditions to determine the thresholds mBA;mAB. These conditions are
analyzed in more detail in the next section.
4.3 The Optimal Trading Thresholds
In this section, we establish how to compute the optimal trading policy, or equivalently, the
spread p.d.f. We show as well some properties of the problem depending on the function v(G).
Interestingly, the optimal policy derived in Theorem 1 is given by three optimality equations.










¡qBA + v(G) if G · mBA
v(G) if mBA < G · mAB
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¾2 dt if G > mAB:
(12)
15Hence, we have that f =
' R 1
¡1 '
































Maximizing W with respect to mBA and mAB yields the following optimality conditions.
Proposition 4 Consider u be the optimal control as de¯ned in Theorem (1). mBA, mAB and
W are jointly characterized by Equation (13) together with
W =
R 1










With the equations above, we can ¯nd numerically the value of the parameters and hence
the optimal function f(G). In addition, under some properties of v(G), the equations allow us
to derive some properties on the optimal thresholds.
Proposition 5 If cAB = cBA, qAB = qBA and v(G) is anti-symmetrical, i.e., v(¡G) = ¡v(G)
for all G, then mBA = ¡mAB.
Furthermore, for the extreme case where the trader's capacity is very small (very limited
market power) mBA and mAB are closer to the trading costs.
Proposition 6 If qAB;qBA ! 0, then mBA ! ¡cBA and mAB ! cAB.
This result shows that our model is robust and that in the limit (when qAB = qBA = 0), our
optimal policy is the same as that of a rational trader with no market power. In addition, one
is able to obtain ¯rst-order approximations of mBA and mAB when the capacities qAB;qBA are
small, see Appendix.
Proposition 6 allows us to derive some interesting conclusions in a \perfect" market, where
all traders are small. In that situation, each trader is going to start trading when the spread is
beyond its transaction cost. As a result, there is a direct relationship between traders' costs,
installed capacities and the market spread long-run distribution. We use this assumption later
16on, in x6.1, in order to estimate the amount of capacity present in the market based on the
price spread distribution.
4.4 Sensitivity analysis
In this section we show some properties of the model with respect to small changes in the
parameters. We have done so numerically with MATLAB because the analytical expressions for
the partial derivatives are untractable. For this purpose, we have taken two di®erent approaches.
We have implemented the explicit analytical function de¯ned in x4.3 and compared the results
with explicit simulations of concrete policies. The results found in both cases are identical
so our model is robust. Figure 4 is an example of this: the simulated p.d.f. (with 10,000
data points) converges to the analytical p.d.f. Since both approaches yield similar results, we
have used below the analytical implementation because the computations are faster than with
simulations.









































Figure 4: Comparison between the analytical pdf (red) in blue and the simulated pdf (blue).
For given cBA;cAB;qBA;qAB;¯;¾;v(¢), the optimal thresholds mBA,mAB are found, through
an exhaustive search, even though it would be computationally more e±cient just to solve
Equations (13), (14) and (15). We also compute the average pro¯t J¤ de¯ned in (6).
Without lost of generality we have assumed that
¾2
2¯
= 1. This is a scaling assumption. In
addition, we have considered two main cases:
17² the symmetric trader: cBA = cBA = c and qBA = qAB = q;
² the uni-directional trader: cBA = 1;cAB = c and qBA = 0;qAB = q.




¡W, and on the thresholds mBA;mAB. Note that for the symmetric trader scenario,
we can apply Proposition 5 and hence mBA = ¡mAB.










































































Figure 5: The symmetric trader. The top ¯gures depict the changes of the optimal mBA;mAB with
changes in c (left) and q (right). The bottom ¯gures show the corresponding changes in average pro¯t
J¤, again with changes in c (left) and q (right). In these ¯gures, we consider that v(G) = 1 when G ¸ 1,
v(G) = ¡1 when G · ¡1 and v(G) = 0 otherwise.
We observe in Figures 5 and 6 that, as one would expect, the trader's average pro¯t decreases
to zero with cost. Any capacity is actually useless for c ¸ 5, since, as the competitor starts
trading jvj = 1 for jGtj ¸ 1, the spread never goes above c. The threshold at which the trader
begins to operate is actually very close to the cost, for the entire range.
In addition, the trader's pro¯t is concave in the capacity, implying decreasing marginal




























































Figure 6: The uni-directional trader. The top ¯gures depict the changes of the optimal mAB with
changes in c (left) and q (right). The bottom ¯gures show the corresponding changes in average pro¯t
J¤, again with changes in c (left) and q (right). In these ¯gures, we consider that v(G) = 1 when G ¸ 1,
v(G) = ¡1 when G · ¡1 and v(G) = 0 otherwise.
19returns on the capacity. The marginal value of capacity is very small for q ¸ 2, since more
capacity tends to reduce the price spreads. As the capacity grows, the threshold also increases,
and can be quite high compared to the cost, e.g., for the symmetric trader, when q = 5, c = 1
and mAB ¼ 1:6.
Interestingly, comparing Figures 5 and 6, one can see that the symmetric trader makes
slightly more than twice the pro¯t for the unidirectional trader. The optimal trading thresholds
are very similar in both cases. This suggests that, in the case of a symmetric trader, the
thresholds could be computed independently, i.e., ¯nd mAB using cAB;qAB > 0 and qBA = 0,
and similarly for mBA. This policy would be close to optimal.
5 Extensions
5.1 Discounted Pro¯t Maximization
One of the strong assumptions of our model is that the trader cares about long-term average
pro¯t. This assumption does simplify the analysis, as it allows treating the objective in an
explicit way, and, as a result, computing closed-form thresholds for the optimal policy. In this
section, we complement the analysis with the discounted pro¯t maximization case. We use
optimal control theory to solve the problem. Denoting as J(G0) the pro¯t-to-go, function of
G0, the current price spread, the maximization problem can be written as
max












where r is the instantaneous discount factor, and such that dGt = ¡¯(ut + v(Gt))dt + ¾dWt
The optimality conditions, see Bertsekas [1], can be captured through the Hamilton-Jacobi-










This implies that u¤(G) = ¡qBA;0;qAB. Hence, a bang-bang policy is optimal in this case
as well. In addition, if G ¡ ¯
dJ
dG
is increasing when equal to ¡cBA;0;cAB, then there exists
mBA;mAB such that u¤(G) = ¡qBA when G · mBA; u¤(G) = qAB when G ¸ mAB; and
¯nally, u¤(G) = 0 when mBA · G · mAB 7.











¡ rJ ¡ (G ¡ c
BA)q












¡ rJ + (G ¡ c
AB)q
AB = 0; and when m










¡ rJ = 0:
205.2 Alternative Price Processes, Cost Structures and Competitor Actions
One of the main advantages in our model is to be able to recast a problem with two stochastic
processes, PA
t and PB
t , into a problem with a single stochastic process Gt = PB
t ¡ PA
t . This
can be done under three main assumptions:
² that dGt can be expressed only as a function of Gt (for instance, that the actions of the
competitors vt only depend on Gt, not on (PA
t ;PB
t ));




When any of these two assumptions is not satis¯ed, then the approach developed in the
paper is signi¯cantly more complicated. We provide guidelines on how to deal with these more




































One particular case of these is the geometric Brownian motion, where ®i = 0, ¯i = Pi
t ¹ ¯i,
and ¾i = Pi
t ¹ ¾i, with ¹ ¯i; ¹ ¾i constants.























where fu satis¯es a partial di®erential equation similar to (3), but in two variables. In this
case, no closed form solution can be easily computed, and fu should be found numerically.
5.3 Trading in a Network
The model developed in this paper considers trading between two pre-determined locations.
However, in reality trading opportunities are possible between many potential origins and des-
tinations. For this purpose, in a network of n points (a connected graph), one can de¯ne the
trading quantities between i and j as uij, the existing trading capacity as qij and the trading





















t for all i 2 f1;:::;ng (18)
21where Pt = (P1
t ;:::;Pn
t ), and Wi
t are (possibly correlated) Wiener processes.
With this new formulation, similar to x5.2, it is impossible to transform the problem into a
single-dimension state space (the price spread). The analysis consequently becomes intractable,
and numerical methods must be used.
6 Conclusions
6.1 Application to Jet-Fuel (Kerosene) Prices
In this section, we analyze the data of jet-fuel (kerosene) spot prices in two locations: New
York Harbor (NY) and Los Angeles (LA). We have taken the data from the Energy Information
Administration from the U.S.Goverment, see http://www.eia.doe.gov. Our objective here is to
apply our model to the trading between these two locations. Trading, as we use it, can be done
in several forms. For example, one can imagine a dedicated trader that buys kerosene in one
market, loads it in a tank truck (which hold from 4000 to 9000 gallons), and ships it to the
other market. This is an expensive way of trading, and would yield per-gallon costs of the order
of 10 USD cents. The capacity available for this would probably be very large8. Our model can
be used by this trader to optimize his actions. We analyze below the outcome of the actions of
the traders: the spread price process.
The series re°ects the spot price in USD cents per gallon from January 1991 to November
2007. We are using prices on markets that open from Monday to Friday, although in a few
cases we do not have data over the entire 5-days week, due to local holidays. As a result, when
calculating the spread series, we have removed the days where information of the price of one or
both locations was missing. These facts (week-ends, holidays and missing data) generate some
complications in our study. In fact, when calculating auto-correlations, i.e., correlations across
successive days, we have to take into account this phenomenon. In other words, although not
having information of the price spread in week-ends, trading on a pipeline or other shipping
systems (e.g., trucks) can occur, moving product from one location to the other. So as a result,
the system has three times more capacity between Friday and Monday than during the week.
Thus, we index the series using natural days, i.e., the time t is indexed from Monday to Sunday.
We have calculated the spread Gt = PNY
t ¡ PLA
t . Table 1 provides the basic statistics
8One can also think of an airline that °ies the NY-LA route and refuels its planes every day in both locations. By buying
a bit more in the cheaper market and a bit less in the more expensive market, this airline is e®ectively trading between the
two markets. This form of trading is also expensive: a B767-400 consumes 7400 liters per hour, weights 200 tons when fully
loaded, which implies that, shipping one gallon between NY and LA consumes about 0.2 gallons, around 40 USD cents per
gallon traded at 2007 kerosene prices.
22summary of the series.
Table 1: Basic statistics of Gt = PNY
t ¡ PLA
t











Notice that the maximum and minimum value of the spread are highly signi¯cant as well as
the high variance. These facts are interesting for a player trading in these markets.
It is also interesting to examine the auto-correlation diagram, shown in Figure 7. Using
the time series terminology, the ¯gure is equivalent to the autocorrelation function (ACF)
but taking in account the missing data. In other words, when calculating the autocorrelation
coe±cients9 at lag k the terms where Gt and/or Gt+k are missing are not considered. The
slow exponential decay in the ACF is a feature that, for example, autoregressive models (AR)
exhibit, and so does ours. In fact, if the data was modeled with a simple AR(1) process, then
we would have a spread process as follows: Gt¡¹ = ®(Gt¡1¡¹)+¾²t where ²t is a white noise,
with mean zero and standard deviation one. This is in some way an alternative to Equation
(2).
More importantly, we depict the spread distribution of the series. Figure (8) shows both
the p.d.f. and its logarithm. In our model, see Equation (5), the slope of the logarithm of
the p.d.f., f0=f is equal to ¡2¯(u(G) + v(G))=¾2. This can be calculated from the ¯gure. In
other words, we can estimate ¡2¯(u(G)+v(G))=¾2 from the data. In a sense, this provides an
aggregate measure for the intensity with which the market brings an o®-average spread back to
the average. Interestingly, this measure can be well approximated through a piecewise constant
function, as follows.
9See Chat¯eld 2004 for more details.








































Figure 7: The autocorrelations for the jet kerosene data taking in account the missing information. The









0:29 for G · ¡5:5
0:00 for ¡ 5:5 < G · ¡1:5
¡0:31 for G > ¡1:5



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































¾2 . Hence the logarithm of the p.d.f. (right-
24hand side in Figure 8) would exhibit a much larger \convexity" in G, an approximation that
does not ¯t the data as well as our model.
If all traders are small compared to the market (which seems a reasonable assumption), then
our model would provide a way to estimate how much total trading capacity u(G) + v(G) is
available at each cost level G. This approach can be used to calibrate some of the parameters
of our model. Some more detailed estimates can be obtained by directly expressing all the price
variations, ¢G = Gt+1 ¡ Gt, when Gt 2 [G ¡ ±;G + ±], as the sum of a constant plus a white
noise. This has the advantage of estimating directly ¡¯(u(G)+v(G)) (the constant) and ¾ (the
standard deviation of the noise). However, it turns out that the estimates are very noisy, and
only look consistent when we aggregate them signi¯cantly (large ±), which is somehow similar
to the estimation performed on f0=f.
6.2 Discussion
The model presented in this paper analyzes the optimal trading strategy for a capacitated
player between markets. We have focused on two markets only, A and B, where the prices
evolve following a correlated random walk, and are in°uenced by the trader's actions. Under
this assumption, we show that it is possible to transform the trader's decision, based on both
prices (PA
t ;PB
t ), into one that only depends on the price spread Gt = PB
t ¡PA
t . We characterize
the optimal trading policy, which is described by two thresholds mBA · mAB such that it is
optimal to trade as much as possible (at capacity) from B to A when Gt · mBA, do nothing
when mBA < Gt · mAB, and again trade as much as possible, from A to B this time, when
Gt > mAB. This sort of policy is intuitively optimal when the trader has no impact on future
prices. We show that the structure remains the same even when the trader moves the market.
Interestingly, the thresholds are very close to the trading costs cBA;cAB when the trading
capacity is small, con¯rming that when the trader is small in the market, then he can safely
assume that he has no market power (although his trading volume has an impact on the long-run
distribution of prices). On the other hand, when the trading capacity is large, the thresholds
can signi¯cantly deviate from the trading costs, as shown in x4.4.
In addition to the basic model, we formulate as well several extensions to more general
situations, in particular where the price processes follow other dynamics, e.g., geometric Brow-
nian motion, or the number of markets is larger than two. The trader optimization problem
can there be solved numerically. These extensions can be explored further, and constitute a
promising direction of future research.
Another extension of our model is to integrate the inventory aspect of the trade. We have
25considered a shipping system where the quantity bought at A is equal to the one sold at B.
This is a fair assumption if we focus on a pipeline. However, if the shipping system is a serial
network of warehouses, then one could consider the possibility of storing inventory somewhere
in that network. The analysis becomes signi¯cantly more complex.
Furthermore, we have applied the insights of our model to the analysis of the price spreads
for kerosene, between New York and Los Angeles. While the average spread is of around
-3 dollar cents, the deviations are fairly signi¯cant: a standard deviation of 6 dollar cents,
maximum spreads of the order of half a dollar, and sometimes a positive spread for a full
month. Assuming that the market is liquid, i.e., that trader enter the market as soon as the
spread is higher than the transaction cost, our model can be helpful to estimate, for each level
of cost, how much trading capacity is available. Such information can also be used to estimate
the impact of any trading capacity addition into the price spread distribution. The speci¯c
application to kerosene spreads is just an example of what can be achieved with the model, and
many alternative applications are possible, in other industries, such as LNG trade, e.g., using
data from Wang et al. (2007).
Finally, we have interpreted the markets A and B as locations where an identical commodity
is traded. The trading capacity represents the shipping capacity per period available, such as
a pipeline, a system of trucks, etc. Interestingly, there is an alternative interpretation of our
results: A and B could represent two di®erent commodities priced in the same location. There,
the trading capacity would represent the transformation capacity per period. Consider for
example PA
t being the price of natural gas, and PB
t the price of electricity, in the same market.
A power generation company could consider its generation capacity as trading capacity from A
to B. Our model would dictate the generation policy for this company, and the distribution of
the price spread (called the spark spread) could be found. Thus, our model is able to describe
analytically what the trader/generator should do. In that respect, our results complement






























after integrating by parts Gf0(G) and remembering that
Z 1
¡1

























































































Now, at the limit for M ! 1, this value is
¾2
2¯
. Indeed, we have f(G) = f(¡M)e
2¯qBA(G+M)
¾2
for G < ¡M, f(G) = f(¡M) = f(M) for ¡M < G < M and f(G) = f(M)e
¡2¯qAB(G¡M)
¾2









f = 0. This implies that, regardless of the policy u(G), the
maximum long term pro¯t we can possibly obtain is
¾2
2¯
. This is achieved as the limit of the
proposed policy.
27Theorem 1
In order to prove Theorem 1, we ¯rst need to prove the following lemma. Proposition 3 is
proved later using the optimality conditions of the theorem.
Lemma 1 Given functions v(G) and h(G) := ¡Gv(G), and an optimal solution f(G) of the
maximization problem (11)






































































































































< qBA ¡ v(G). De¯ne ~ u(G) = u(G) + ² for
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g0 e²(G¡g0)f(G)dG + e²± R 1
g0+± f





g0 e²(G¡g0)f(G)dG + e²± R 1
g0+± f





g0 e²(G¡g0)f(G)dG + e²± R 1
g0+± f
if G > g0 + ±
(20)






















































































































A Taylor approximation with respect to ² and ± (hence considering that ±2 ¿ ±), yields that
J²;±(G) =
R 1
¡1 Hf + ²±
½
R 1

























Since f is optimal, we have J²;± · J, for ²;± small, which yields after some algebra, that
R 1




























< qAB +v(G) yields the second part of the lemma.
We are now ready to show the theorem.





























¡ v. We claim that
(i) u(G) = qAB when G ! 1;
(ii) u(G) = qAB for G > mAB for some mAB;
(iii) u(G) = 0 for mBA < G < mAB for some mBA · mAB; and
(iv) u(G) = ¡qBA for G < mBA.



































g0 f ¸ W:
The left-hand side expression of the necessary condition is bounded from above by
R 1


























g0 ¡(G ¡ cAB)v(G)f(G)dG
R 1
g0 f
Since, for g0 > cAB, ¡(G ¡ cAB)v(G) is decreasing (because v(G) is positive when G is very
large), the right-hand side tends to ¡1 as g0 ! 1. Hence this contradicts the necessary
condition from the lemma. As a result, for G large enough u(G) = qAB, and that implies (i).















































g0 ¡(G ¡ cAB)v(G)f(G)dG
R 1
g0 f
where again we transformed f(g0) into
R 1
g0 (¡f0=f)£f, and used Equation (5). As before, this
is continuous and hence it is optimal to set u(g0) = qAB for g0 > mAB, where mAB is such that
R 1
































= W + ²0 > W;
for ²0 > 0 very small. Is is clear that u(g0) > 0 cannot be optimal, as the necessary condition







































g0 ¡(G + cBA)v(G)f(G)dG +
R 1


















These equations hold until the ¯rst one becomes an equality (since the right-hand side of the
second equation is decreasing if equal to W, and the right-hand side of the ¯rst equation also










Finally, for G < mBA, the optimal decision is to set u(G) = ¡qBA, as the necessary condition
for u < ¡qBA is not satis¯ed.
Proposition 3
Proof. Consider mBA and mAB de¯ned in the previous proof, when cAB = cBA = 0. Clearly,
the case of part (iii) is now empty, and hence mBA = mAB.
31Proposition 4
Proof. W is the value of the trader's problem for the optimal policy described at Theorem
1, and the equation for mAB is Equation (15), given in the proof of Theorem 1. In that same






















































¡1 (f0=f) £ f, and using Equation (5) yields
R mBA






¡1 (¡Gv ¡ cBAqBA ¡ cBA(¡qBA + v))'dG
R mBA
¡1 '
and hence Equation (14).
Proposition 5
Proof. We denote cAB = cBA = c, qAB = qBA = q. Let us consider the following change of
variables: G = ¡s, ~ mBA = ¡mAB, ~ mAB = ¡mBA and ~ '(s) = '(¡s) where mBA and mAB
are given by Equations (14) and (15) in Proposition 4. We claim that if v(¡G) = ¡v(G) then
~ mBA; ~ mAB and ~ W = W also solve the optimality equations of Proposition 4.
Indeed, we have that
~ W =
R ~ mBA
¡1 (¡Gv(G) ¡ cq)~ '(G)dG +
R ~ mAB
~ mBA ¡Gv(G)~ '(G)dG +
R 1




R ¡ ~ mBA
+1 (sv(¡s) ¡ cq)~ '(¡s)(¡ds) +
R ¡ ~ mAB
¡ ~ mBA sv(¡s)(¡ds)~ '(¡s)(¡ds) +
R ¡1













32where we made the change of variables s = ¡G and used the fact that v is anti-symmetrical.
It is now clear that applying the change of variables,
R ~ mBA





mAB ¡(G ¡ c)v(G)'(G)dG
R 1
mAB '(G)dG
= W = ~ W;
i.e., satis¯es Equation (14). Similarly, it satis¯es Equation (15) as well. In conclusion, ~ mBA; ~ mAB
and ~ W are also solutions of the optimality equations and hence, since the solutions are unique,
mBA = ¡mAB.
Proposition 6


























On the other hand, (14) is now
W =
R mBA



























Thus as the optimal solution is unique, we have that mBA +cBA = 0 and hence mBA = ¡cBA.
Similarly mAB = cAB when qAB = qBA = 0.
When qAB;qBA > 0 but very small, we know that (mBA;mAB) are uniquely de¯ned by
0 =
R 1


























33This is a system of two equations Ã1(mBA;mAB;qBA;qAB) = 0 and Ã2(mBA;mAB;qBA;qAB) =
0 with two unknowns, and two parameters qBA;qAB. Since Ã is continuously di®erentiable,
then (mBA;mAB) is continuous in (qBA;qAB) around (0;0). We thus have that, for small
qBA;qAB, the deviations around mBA = ¡cBA and mAB = cAB are respectively mBA + cBA








dmAB(mAB¡cAB)+o(qBA)+o(qAB) = 0; (21)
where o(x)=x ! 0 when x ! 0.












































































































































































34As a result, we can express Equation (21) as















+ o(qBA) + o(qAB)
and















+ o(qBA) + o(qAB):
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